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It is well settled, in cases both before and after the adoption of the
N.I.L., that the holder of a negotiable instrument who intentionally
destroys his instrument with the intention of cancelling the obligation
discharges the obligation. 4
Before the N.I.L., where there was a voluntary destruction of the
instrument, it was held to be cancellation of the instrument and the
obligation, even though no intent to -forgive the obligation was mani-
fested or made an issue in the case. The reason generally stated for
precluding recovery was the prevention of fraud.6
It has been held under sections 119 and 123 of the N.I.L. that volun-
tary destruction of three promissory notes worked a cancellation 'of
the instruments but not necessarily of the obligations thereon.7 Also,
cancellation by mutilation must be accompanied by an intent to cancel
the obligation, and such intent is an essential element to its discharge.8
Distinguishing cancellation of the instrument and cancellation of
the obligation, 9 where no intent to cancel can be shown, seems sound
since cancellation of the instrument may be inoperative because of
error or mistake, under the wording of section 123.10
Although the possibility of fraud has been said to be the crux of
the rationale for denying recovery in intentional destruction cases,
where notes,11 letters,'12 contracts 13 and deeds14 have been destroyed
by mistake or through the ordinary course of business, the generally
accepted rule of evidence is to permit secondary evidence to be intro-
duced to prove the contents of the destroyed paper, provided that the
cellation was made unintentionally, or under a mistake or without authority."
'Wilkins v. Skoglund, 127 Neb. 589, 256 N.W. 31 (1934); Norton v. Smith,
136 Me. 58, 153 Atl. 886 (1931); Manker v. Manker, 249 Ill. App. 161 (1928);
McDonald v. Loomis, 233 Mich. 174, 206 N.W. 348 (1925); Hensen v. Hensen,
151 Tenn. 137, 268 S.W. 378 (1925); Jones Adm'rs v. Coleman, 121 Va. 86, 92
S.E. 910 (1917); Sullivan v. Shea, 32 Cal. App. 369, 162 Pac. 925 (1916); Mont-
gomery v. Schwald, 177 Mo. App. 75, 166 S.W. 831 (1914); Conner v. Martin,
46 Ind. App. 141, 92 N.E. 3 (1910); Kester v. Kester, 38 Ore. 10, 63 Pac. 635
(1900); Larkin v. Hardinbrook, 90 N.Y. 333 (1882); Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa
503, 3 N.W. 510 (1879); Licey v. Licey, 7 Pa. 251 (1848).
'Booth v. Smith, 3 Fed. Cas. 888, No. 1649 (C.C.D.La. 1876); Vanauken v.
Hornbeck, 14 N.J.L. 179 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
'Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 14 N.J.L. 179 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
Greene v. Poz, 182 N.Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dep't 1920).
8In re Lock's Will, 187 Misc. 535, 64 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
'First Nat. Bank of Wellston v. Patton Co., 32 Ohio Dec. 627 (1910).
10 Broad and Market Nat. Bank of Newark v. New York and Eastern Realty
Co., 102 Misc. 82, 168 N.Y. Supp. 149 (2d Dep't 1917).
"Bagley v. McMickle, 9 Cal. 430 (1858) (negotiable instrument); Blade v.
Noland, 12 Wend. 173 (N.Y. 1834) (court presumed notes to be non-negotiable
in absence of contrary proof).
:-2 Dearing v. Pearson, 8 Misc. 269, 28 N.Y. Supp. 715 (N.Y. C.P. 1894); Tobin
v. Shaw, 45 Me. 331 (1858).
"3Davis v. Teachout's Estate, 126 Mich. 135, 85 N.W. 475 (1901); Riggs v.
Tayloe, 9 Wheat. 480 (U.S. 1824).SBlake v. Fash, 44 Ill. 302 (1867).

